PART TWO: Force for Liberty or for Oppression? Vietnam

Our military theoreticians and practitioners conceive of counterinsurgency as though it were just another branch of warfare like artillery or chemical warfare, to be taught in special schools and applied with technical proficiency wherever the occasion arises. This view derives of course from a complete misconception of the nature of civil war.
Hans J. Morgenthau, 1965

Nguyen Sinh Cung lived in New York from 1912 to 1913 and in London until 1919. From 1919 to 1923 the man who we would come to know as Ho Chi Ming lived in France.

Like his father he was a nationalist who wanted to rid Vietnam of its colonial masters, the French. He is said to have tried to meet with President Wilson after World War I in 1919 as the major powers negotiated the terms of peace. Ho Chi Ming wanted to make his case for the independence of Vietnam. Wilson did not meet with him and he went on to Russia and China for further studies until he formed the Vietminh independence movement in 1941.

The Vietminh were fighting the Japanese forces occupying Vietnam. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of the CIA, sent agents to Indochina to work with Vietnamese against the Japanese. Ho Chi Ming was approached by the OSS and became Agent #19. The OSS assessment of Agent #19 was that he was more of a committed nationalist than a communist.

In 1945, Ho Chi Ming founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The celebration in Hanoi was attended by 400,000 people and American military officers were present on the reviewing stand. General Vo Nguyen Giap made his remarks and commented on “Vietnam’s special affection for America”. Ho Chi Ming read the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, modeled on our very own.

All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and free.
Ho Chi Ming, Independence Speech in Hanoi, September 2, 1945

Following the celebration of their newfound independence, Ho Chi Ming wrote several letters to President Truman and to the State Department asking for our moral support in their fight against the returning French colonialists. He compared the French to the English at the time of the US War of Independence. None of his letters received a response.

Our State Department did recommend that the US resist France’s efforts to reclaim Indochina. France, after its humiliating defeat and Nazi occupation during WW II, was intent on recapturing its stature as a colonial power. As the threat of Stalin and Communism became the focus of our attention we opted to help France preserve its Michelin rubber plantations in return for their support in Europe. In 1950 the US recognized the French puppet emperor, Bao Dai.

The United States embarked upon another ill-conceived adventure doomed to end in another self-inflicted defeat. It will not help the United States in its struggle against Communism. It will help the Communists in their struggle against the United States.
Harold Isaacs, Newsweek Reporter as quoted in Backfire, 1950

The State Department chose to believe in the “reports” provided to it by the French and its own US Consul General which claimed that Ho Chi Ming’s popularity among the people was declining while Bao Dai’s was gaining. That certainly was a “politically correct” assessment.

In 1954 the US intervened militarily to rescue the French military after their defeat at Dien Bien Phu. That same year the Geneva Accords between the French and the Vietminh divided the country into North and South Vietnam and called for general elections in 1956 for its reunification. The elections were never held and Ho Chi Ming was branded a communist by our policymakers.

Then Senator John F. Kennedy correctly deduced that military aid alone could not defeat a native political organization and that a French presence would ensure a communist victory. President Eisenhower was willing to train the South Vietnamese and provide naval and air support. He was firm in his resolve that our soldiers would not fight on the ground. Then Senator Lyndon Johnson was opposed to the war altogether as it would be seen as perpetuating colonialism. Of the three, Johnson would later adopt a much different position on the conflict.

In the meantime, the French installed “Emperor” Bao Dai appointed Ngo Dinh Diem as Prime Minister of South Vietnam. But few knew that Diem was “our guy”. Our guy would later get rid of Bao Dai and become the dictator of South Vietnam until his death.

Diem was discovered in Japan by a political science professor from Michigan State University. They traveled to the United States to meet with Cardinal Spellman who became Diem’s sponsor. Diem, a devout Catholic, lived in Maryknoll seminaries in New Jersey and New York. As a Catholic and ardent anti-communist he caught the attention of then Senator Kennedy and Senator Mansfield. Our policymakers deemed him useful to the US vision of a democratic South Vietnam.

Diem was not the “democrat” we took him for. For one thing, he installed his family throughout government in positions of authority. In a predominantly Buddhist nation, an ardent Catholic and former French colonialist civil servant who preferred speaking French was now in charge of South Vietnam. A veritable puppet circus, the emperor and his prime minister were naturally viewed by the people as an extension of colonial oppression. Elections to reunify Vietnam were not held in 1956 because Diem and Eisenhower believed that Ho Chi Ming would garner nearly 80 percent of the votes cast.

The intended shining example of an economically robust and free South Vietnam, as compared to the North, missed its mark. Nepotism, corruption and a total disregard for the predominant cultural traditions were obvious. Saigon looked like a cheap knock-off of a Western city. While our newly formed Special Forces were highly effective, our conventional forces were not. The people felt our munitions while our “foreign aid” was squandered by Diem and his cronies. Strategies like the strategic hamlets program separated the people from their land. This act alone severed the spiritual tie between a relocated peasant and his ancestors. We lost popular support and measured our progress by “body counts” and quantities of munitions shot or dropped.

All the while and behind the scenes, the CIA carried out its paramilitary operations with little or no oversight. It operated freely in Burma, Laos and Cambodia. The tactics they employed in Indochina were put to good use elsewhere particularly and most recently in Central America in the 1980s and 1990s. The question to consider is ‘at what cost’? To appreciate the CIA mindset, google “Operation Northwoods”, a false-flag operation that called for US operations directed against American citizens and installations to place the blame on Cuba. It would give the US a righteous justification for an invasion of Cuba. It was never implemented.

By 1963, it was clear that the military of South Vietnam were incapable or unwilling to achieve a decisive victory on the field of battle. President Diem, by now a de facto dictator, alienated the people and functioned like a distorted image of Vietnam’s former French masters. Because the US did not revisit its “anti-communist policies” soon enough the United States steered a course toward its first major military defeat.

President Kennedy was not accepted by the “northeast elite”, many of whom had high posts in government. The CIA was highly displeased with President Kennedy. Why? Despite Kennedy’s anti-communist position, he cancelled US support for the Bay of Pigs invasion and by 1963 appeared as if he was ready to withdraw US support from South Vietnam. The CIA’s covert, paramilitary operations were at risk of being curtailed or shut down altogether. This could have readily been interpreted as our capitulation in the war against the spread of communism.

I don’t think that unless a greater effort is made by the government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it – the people of Vietnam – against the communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don’t think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last two months the government has gotten out of touch with the people.
President John F. Kennedy, CBS interview with Walter Cronkite, September 2, 1963

On November 2, 1963 President Diem was arrested and executed. Just 20 days later, on November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Lyndon Johnson was sworn in as President.

It is ironic that President Johnson, despite his opposition to the war as a Senator, was responsible for greatly expanding our involvement in the war and for our ultimate defeat in Southeast Asia. Under President Eisenhower there were fewer than 1000 of our military in South Vietnam. President Kennedy expanded our advisory role and our presence in 1963 was 16,300. The controversial Gulf of Tonkin incident resulted in the Tonkin Resolution and our presence in 1964 amounted to 23,300 Americans.

This joint “Tonkin” resolution stated, “The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression”. The public was told the Gulf of Tonkin incident was unprovoked. The public was told a lie; Secretary of Defense McNamara denied that the US destroyers were part of covert “34A raids” carried out by South Vietnam against the North. The Johnson Administration now had Congressional authorization and a redefined role for US forces in South Vietnam. Our military presence grew to 385,300 in 1965 and by 1968 we had 536,100 assigned to the conflict.

President Johnson resigned after one elected term in office. He was replaced by Richard Nixon who negotiated “peace with honor” and fulfilled his campaign promise to get rid of the draft. While President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger worked diligently to “save face” for the US politically, our military bore the brunt of the misdirected contempt and insults by fellow citizens. Most of our military served honorably and fulfilled their duties. Those responsible for the poor choices along the way were our General Officers. They failed to influence policy as it was developed by their civilian leaders and most failed to see the importance of our Special Forces.

America in 1970 was still insular and inward looking. Our news agencies, then as now, focus on disasters and crises with little emphasis on anything else. Schools have generally abandoned strong curriculums that expose all students to the humanities or liberal arts. Liberal Arts have traditionally been considered essential to a well rounded education. Our 20th century penchant for technology has worked against our appreciation of man, our nature, and the consequences of our actions, both good and bad, throughout history. The technological mentality led us astray in Vietnam. At each major juncture leading up to our direct military involvement individuals with important information were never heard; they were either too low in the hierarchy or, like Ho Chi Ming, obviously unimportant to any senior bureaucrat.

The technological mentality designs standardized means to achieve predetermined results.…In a technological society authority is located in the process itself.…Spontaneity and eccentricity are the enemies of technology….It is impatient with intuition, experience, and judgement….It has an irresistible tilt toward mathematical conclusions….When the technological mind is turned to the problems of organizing human activity, the result is bureaucracy….The result…is impersonality, procedures rather than on-the-spot intelligence, authoritative regulations, not people with authority.
Loren Baritz, Backfire, pages 32-33

And that is why Special Forces were so effective in Vietnam; they were not guided by a technological mentality. It is the cause of tension between the Special Ops community and the conventional forces. This tension exists to this day and explains why conventional forces don’t fare well in unconventional situations. Unconventional thinking cannot be captured in an SOP (i.e., Standard Operating Procedures for my civilian readers). The individual either has the capability or not.

“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American Colonel.
The North Vietnamese Colonel pondered this remark a moment. “That may be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant.”
Conversation on April 25, 1975 in Hanoi between Colonel Summers and Colonel Tu

In Parts Three through Seven, I will look at El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama and their usefulness to the consideration of policy and operations in future years in light of the spirit of our Constitution.